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WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE UNDER WASHINGTON LAW-
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Wanrow,' examined
the issue of self-defense for women under Washington law and held
that the application of traditional self-defense rules resulted in preju-
dicial treatment of women defendants. This note will examine the
meaning of the Wanrow decision and offer support for its holding in
light of available psychological and sociological data. Additionally,
this note will suggest a special analytical framework utilizing social
science data to test accepted legal doctrines for latent sex discrimina-
tion. The importance of these data in exposing such discrimination
will be shown by examining related cases in the area of sexual assault.
It is concluded that, while the analysis in the Wanrow case is defi-
cient, the result finds support in empirical data and is a forward step
in the area of self-defense law in Washington.
I. THE CASE
A. - The Facts and Procedural History
Yvonne Wanrow was charged with second-degree murder for the
fatal shooting of William Wesler, a man whom Wanrow believed to
be a child molester.2 The shooting occurred in the home of a friend of
Wanrow when Wesler entered uninvited, refused to leave, and ap-
proached one of the children present in the home.3 Wanrow was pre-
sent in the home of her friend as a result of an incident involving
Wesler which occurred the day prior to the shooting. On that day, the
friend's son reported that Wesler tried to pull him off his bicycle and
drag him into a house. The friend also learned on that day from her
daughter that Wesler was the man who had molested her daughter
months earlier. The friend's landlord reported that Wesler had previ-
1. 88 Wn. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
2. Wanrow was also charged with and convicted of first-degree assault for the
wounding of a friend of Wesler, present at the time Wesler was shot.
3. Many of the facts were disputed throughout the trial. The different theories ap-
pear in the appellant's and respondent's briefs to the Court of Appeals, Division Three.
Brief for Appellant, State v. Wanrow, 14 Wn. App. 115, 538 P.2d 849 (1975); Brief for
Respondent, State v. Wanrow, 14 Wn. App. 115, 538 P.2d 849 (1975). The facts stated
herein are those found in the Washington Supreme Court opinion.
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ously been committed to the Eastern State Hospital for the mentally
ill and had tried to molest a young boy who had lived in the same
house earlier. Upon being told by the police that no arrest could be
made until the following Monday, the friend asked Wanrow to stay
with her in her house through the night. Wanrow's sister and brother-
in-law also joined in the vigil that night. It was early the following
morning when Wesler unexpectedly arrived, approached the child
and was fatally wounded by Wanrow.4
At trial the prosecution introduced a tape recording of the tele-
phone conversation between the police operator and Wanrow, made
without her knowledge, in which she reported the shooting. Wanrow
was convicted of second-degree murder over her plea of self-defense.
On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
holding that the tape recording was inadmissible under two Washing-
ton statutes prohibiting the nonconsensual recording of private tele-
phone conversations. 5
The decision was appealed to the Washington Supreme Court,
which found two grounds for affirming the appellate court decision. 6
The first was the erroneous admission of the tape recording; the sec-
4. 88 Wn. 2d at 224-26, 559 P.2d at 549-50(1977).
5. State v. Wanrow, 14 Wn. App. 115, 538 P.2d 849 (1975). The telephone conver-
sation between Wanrow and the police operator fell within R.C.W. § 9.73.030(1), which
makes it unlawful to intercept, record, or divulge any "[p] rivate communication
transmitted by telephone . . . between two or more individuals . . . without first ob-
taining the consent of all the participants in the communication." WASH. REV. CODE
§9.73.030(1) (Supp. 1977). R.C.W. § 9.73.050 further provides that "[a] ny information
obtained in violation of RCW 9.73.030 . . .shall be inadmissible in any . . . criminal
case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state." Id. § 9.73.050. The
court, in reversing the conviction, rejected the respondent's argument that this conversa-
tion fell within the exception stated in R.C.W. § 9.73.090(1) which reads, "The provi-
sions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 shall not apply to police and fire personnel in
the following instances: (1) Recording incoming telephone calls to police and fire sta-
tions for the purpose and only for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of reception of
emergency calls," Id. § 9.73.090. The appellate decision on these statutes is discussed
with approval in 11 GONz. L. REv. 792 (1976).
6. The case was remanded with retrial set for October 1977. The prosecution
charged second-degree murder under the Washington felony-murder statute, Criminal
Code, ch. 249, § 141(2), 1909 Wash. Laws 930 (current version at WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.32.050(b) (1976)). The Washington statute allows an assault to provide the basis for
a felony-murder charge. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 88 Wn. 2d 13, 558 P.2d 202
(1977) (refusal by Washington Supreme Court to adopt the "merger" doctrine).
Using an assault as the basis for a felony-murder charge is contrary to the "merger"
doctrine followed in most other states. The doctrine provides that a felonious assault
which is an integral element of a homicide may not be used as the underlying felony for
a felony-murder charge. See Note, The Doctrine of Merger in Felony-Murder and Mis-
demeanor-Manslaughter, 35 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 109 (1960). But see Note, Assault Lead-
ing to Homicide May Be Used to Invoke Felony-Murder Rule, 28 MERCER L. REV. 371
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ond was the self-defense instruction,7 which erroneously limited the
jury's consideration of factors relevant to determining a female defen-
dant's perception of her peril. This comment focuses on the self-de-
fense issue.
B. The Holding
The Washington Supreme Court found two separate, but equally
"erroneous and prejudicial,"'8 errors in the self-defense instruction.
First, the instructions limited the jury's consideration to acts or cir-
cumstances "at or immediately before the killing."9 The court stated
that the instruction "is not now, and never has been, the law of self-
defense in Washington."'10 A review of Washington case law shows the
correct approach is for the jury to consider "all the facts and circum-
stances... existing at or prior to the time of the alleged shooting.""
In other words, even facts known to the defendant substantially be-
fore the killing are to be considered. Under the facts of the Wanrow
case it was especially important for the jury to consider events
substantially prior to the shooting in evaluating the reasonableness of
Wanrow's acts. Much of her apprehension resulted from information
she had received the day before the shooting regarding Wesler's past
acts.
The second error in the self-defense instruction 12 was its use of an
(1976) (discussing a Georgia case allowing an assault to provide the felony for a felony-
murder charge).
In October 1977, Wanrow's attorneys moved for a dismissal of the felony-murder
charge, on the ground that it was unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. Upon the
trial court's denial, the defense sought discretionary review by the Washington Supreme
Court, which was granted. Oral argument was made on March 13, 1978, but no written
decision had been published as of the time this note was printed.
7. 88 Wn. 2d at 233, 559 P.2d at 555 (5-3 decision, with Justice Wright concurring
only as to the first ground).
8. Id. at 239, 559 P.2d at 558.
9. The first paragraph of Instruction No. 10 reads:
To justify killing in self-defense, there need be no actual or real danger to the life
or person of the party killing, but there must be, or reasonably appear to be, at or
immediately before the killing, some overt act, or some circumstances which would
reasonably indicate to the party killing that the person slain is, at the time, en-
deavoring to kill him or inflict upon him great bodily harm.
Id. at 234 n.7, 559 P.2d at 555 n.7 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
11. State v. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210, 220, 100 P. 309, 313 (1909) (emphasis added).
Accord, State v. Tribett, 74 Wash. 125, 132 P. 875 (1913); State v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369,
70 P. 963 (1902); State v. Lewis, 6 Wn. App. 38, 41,491 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1971).
12. The second paragraph of Instruction 10 reads:
However, when there is no reasonable ground for the person attacked to believe
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"objective" rather than a "subjective" standard to judge the reason-
ableness of Wanrow's actions. 13 The court stated that limiting a de-
fendant's justifiable use of a deadly weapon to cases in which there
are reasonable grounds to believe an assault with "naked hands" will
result in death or grievous bodily harm1 4 fails to stress the importance
of factors in the defendant's perspective. The force used may be that
which appears necessary to "a reasonable person in the same situation
. . .seeing what [s] he sees and knowing what [s] he knows." 15 In
other words, the jury is to decide according to the subjective impres-
sion of the "conditions appearing to [the defendant] at the time, not
by the condition as it might appear to the jury in the light of testimony
before it."1 6 The court found that a later instruction directing the jury
to consider the "relative size and strength of the persons involved"
was not enough to cure this error. 17 Additionally, the court found the
that his person is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it appears
to him that only an ordinary battery is all that is intended, and all that he has rea-
sonable grounds to fear from his assailant, he has a right to stand his ground and re-
pel such threatened assault, yet he has no right to repel a threatened assault with
naked hands, by the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner, unless he believes.
and has reasonable grounds to believe, that he is in imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm.
88 Wn. 2d at 239, 559 P.2d at 558 (emphasis in original).
13. Id. at 240. 559 P.2d at 558. While the court never explicitly defines "subjec-
tive," the cited cases adopt a middle ground. The test for self-defense considers what a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have perceived or apprehended, in
addition to what the defendant actually perceived. There must be actual fear of death or
great bodily harm, as well as a reasonable fear arising from all the surrounding circum-
stances. See, e.g., State v. Stockhammer, 34 Wash. 262, 75 P. 810 (1904).
This standard for justifying self-defensive acts is the standard used in the majority of
jurisdictions. See note 38 infra. Confusion arises from the Washington court's use of the
term "subjective" in combination with the rule that the acts must be reasonable. A "sub-
jective" standard refers only to the actor's honest belief while an "objective" standard
considers the belief that a reasonable person with certain of the actor's characteristics
would have. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 151 (4th ed. 1971). The Wanrow
decision must be read with this special definition of "subjective" in mind.
14. The Washington court has defined "grievous bodily harm." for the purpose of
self-defense, as "an injury of a graver and more serious nature than an ordinary battery
with the fist or pounding with the hand: an injury of such nature as to produce severe
pain, suffering or injury." State v. Lewis, 6 Wn. App. 38, 42-43. 491 P.2d 1062, 1064
(1971).
15. 88 Wn. 2d at 238, 559 P.2d at 557 (citing State v. Dunning, 8 Wn. App. 340,
342, 506 P.2d 321, 322 (1973)) (emphasis added).
16. 88 Wn. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558 (citing State v. Miller, 141 Wash. 104. 105.
250 P. 645 (1926)). Accord, State v. Tyree, 143 Wash. 313. 255 P. 382 (1927): State v.
Tribett, 74 Wash. 125, 130, 132 P. 875, 877 (1913).
17. Instruction No. 12 reads in pertinent part as follows:
In connection with the defense of justification, you are instructed that you may
consider the words and actions of the deceased prior to the homicide, the relative
size and strength of the persons involved, together with any and all factors which in
yourjudgment may bear upon your determination as to whether the defendant rea-
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use of the masculine gender in the self-defense instruction 8 to be er-
ror because it created the impression that the standard to be applied is
that applicable to an altercation between two men.' 9
The court indicated that the holding as to the erroneous instruction
was merely a restatement of well-established Washington case law.20
However, in applying a "subjective" standard, it recognized the im-
portance of previously ignored psychological and environmental fac-
tors21 and thus added new elements to the self-defense justification for
women defendants. As will be demonstrated below, the decision is
supported by available psychological, sociological, and linguistic evi-
dence.
II. SUPPORT FOR THE HOLDING
A. Equal Protection for Women Defendants
The Washington court found the instruction prejudicial in part be-
cause it violated Wanrow's right to equal protection of the law.22 The
sonably believed herself in danger of grievous bodily harm at the time in question.
But a person who is attacked has no right to use greater force than he or she hon-
estly believes is necessary, or has reasonable grounds to believe is necessary for
self-defense.
88 Wn. 2d at 246-47 n. 11, 559 P.2d at 561-62 n.3 (emphasis in original).
18. See note 9 supra.
19. 88 Wn. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
20. Id. at 234, 240-41, 559 P.2d at 555, 559.
21. Although the court did not explicitly outline the additional factors, it indicated
that the defendant's actions must be judged in light of her "perceptions" including those
which are "the product of our nation's 'long and unfortunate history of sex discrimina-
tion.'" Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684(1973)). The court further stated that the defendant's conduct must be 'judged in light of
the individual physical handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination." Id. Here
the court was referring to unequal access to training in and development of defensive
skills, mentioned earlier in the opinion. Id. at 239, 559 P.2d at 558.
While the holding may be limited to these "physical handicaps," the court found that
the jury's consideration of the "relative size and strength" of the parties was in itself in-
sufficient to correct the prejudicial self-defense instructions. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
This finding suggests that the court intended its holding to include additionally certain
developmental factors which influence a female defendant's perception of her ability to
defend herself against a male assailant.
22. The court stated:
The impression created [by the instruction] -that a 5-foot 4-inch woman with a
cast on her leg and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an assault by
a 6-foot 2-inch intoxicated man without employing weapons in her defense, unless
the jury finds her determination of the degree of danger to be objectively reasona-
ble-constitutes a separate and distinct misstatement of the law and, in the context
of this case, violates the respondent's right to equal protection of the law.
88 Wn. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
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court's failure to explain fully its equal protection theory, however,
leaves unclear the meaning of this finding for future cases.
Two possible interpretations arise from the opinion. The holding
might be read to mean that the use of either the deadly weapon limita-
tion or the use of masculine gender pronouns in jury instructions on
self-defense gives rise to equal protection violations for all women de-
fendants. Thus construed, the opinion would establish a per se rule by
which all women defendants claiming self-defense would be entitled
to have additional psychological and environmental factors consid-
ered.23
The court cited several recent cases in the area of sex discrimina-
tion and women's equal protection.2 4 While these cases are distin-
guishable from Wanrow,25 they all stand for the principle that equal
protection means that "no person . . . shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons . . . in the
same place and under like circumstances. '2 6 The equal protection
clause 27 is violated if there is "dissimilar treatment for men and
women who are ... similarly situated. '2 8 It could be argued that by
citing these cases, the court established a test for a per se equal protec-
tion challenge to jury instructions.
In addition, some of the language in the opinion supports this view.
The court stated that until the effects of this country's history of sex
discrimination are eradicated, care must be taken to assure that self-
defense instructions afford women the right to have their conduct
judged by their own perceptions. 29 The court observed that women in
our society suffer from a lack of access to self-defense training. 30 The
23. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
24. 88 Wn. 2d at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th
Cir. 1972); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wn. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975)).
25. None of the cases dealt with the self-defense issue. None of the cases dealt with
women defendants and the criminal justice system. In each case cited, the reviewing
court examined a statute or regulation which distinguished between male and female
and found that the statute or regulation was unconstitutional under the state or federal
law. In Wanrow, no statutory or regulatory classification was involved, nor did the
Washington court specify whether state or federal equal protection was violated.
26. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972) (quoting Moore v. Missouri.
159 U.S. 673, 678 (1895)).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
29. 88 Wn. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
30. Id. at 239, 559 P.2d at 558.
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language in these passages implies that the rule of the case applies to
all women defendants. 31
The second interpretation is that the court found an equal protec-
tion violation with reference to this particular defendant, and will in
the future apply its holding in Wanrow on a case-by-case basis. Again,
there is language in the decision to support this view. The court expli-
citly described the physical characteristics of both Wanrow and the
decedent Wesler.32 It found an equal protection violation "in the con-
text of this case," and declared that this "respondent" was entitled to
an adjudication in light of her perceptions.33 A failure to afford such
adjudication would deny the right of "the individual woman" to a trial
by the same rules applicable to a male defendant.34 This emphasis on
an individual defendant's characteristics might indicate the court's in-
tention to limit Wanrow in the future to a case-by-case application for
women defendants. 35
The precise meaning of the equal protection portion of the Wan-
row decision must await further clarification in later decisions.
However, it is possible to support the result of the Wanrow self-de-
fense decision without relying on the equal protection analysis. The
court found that consideration of the additional perceptual factors
cited36 was necessary in the application of the "subjective" standard37
required by Washington precedent in all self-defense cases. Under
this subjective standard a court must consider a defendant's ac-
3 1. This interpretation, however, leads to difficulties. If a per se rule were estab-
lished, it would apply to all women even though, in a particular case, an individual
woman defendant may have had training in self-defense and may not have experienced
the handicaps envisioned by the court. In that case, the defendant would be tried under a
broader self-defense justification than that used in other cases.
32. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
33. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
34. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 559.
35. Difficulties arise from this interpretation also. There may be cases in which a
male defendant claiming self-defense will be subject to the same physical or perceptual
"handicaps" identified in the opinion, as in the case of a man raised in a strictly nonvio-
lent atmosphere. The Wanrow decision would not reach this defendant as it is limited to
perceptions of women which are the product of our nation's history of sex discrimina-
tion.
However, the court in Wanrow was presented only with the problem of self-defense
for a woman defendant. It is possible that in a future case involving a male defendant,
the court will extend the logic of the Wanrow analysis to men as well as women, and will
base its decision not on the grounds of sex discrimination but on the grounds that con-
sideration of additional perceptual factors is necessary in applying a "subjective" stan-
dard of self-defense.
36. See note 21 supra.
37. See note 13 supra.
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tual as well as reasonable fear. If the importance of these additional
perceptual factors in ascertaining a defendant's actual fear can be
supported, they will necessarily be part of the subjective standard.
The following discussion reviews the empirical support for this seg-
ment of the Wanrow decision.
B. New Elements for the "Subjective" View
1. The deadly weapon limitation
Most jurisdictions require an honest yet reasonable belief that
death or great bodily harm is threatened to justify the use of a deadly
weapon in self-defense. 38 Generally this requirement precludes the use
of a deadly weapon against an unarmed assailant;39 in most jurisdic-
tions such a use may be justified only under certain special circum-
stances. Most frequently, these circumstances are limited to attacks in
which there is a great disparity in size between the assailant and the
defendant 40 or in which there are multiple assailants41 or the nature of
the attack is particularly violent.42 Psychological or learning disad-
vantages generally play no part in the evaluation of the justification. 43
38. State v. Stockhammer, 34 Wash. 262, 75 P. 810 (1904). See WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.16.050 (1976). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM
LAWS ANNOT. 478. The Model Penal Code rule requires only an honest belief that force
is immediately necessary. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 53, at 391 (1972); 20 Cal. Jur. 3d Criminal Law § 1777 et seq. (Ban-
croft-Whitney 1975); 40 CJ.S. Homicide § 114 (1944 & Supp. 1976).
39. The jury instruction given in the Wanrow case reflected these requirements. See
note 12 supra.
40. E.g., Willingham v. State, 262 Ala. 550, 80 So. 2d 280 (1955) (dictum) (great
disparity in physical power may justify use of deadly weapon against unarmed man):
Hinson v. State, 218 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 1969) (when unarmed assailant is much superior
physically to one assaulted, use of deadly weapon is justified); Kress v. State, 176 Tenn.
478, 144 S.W.2d 735 (1940) (in fairness and justice, wife is justified in using a deadly
weapon when attacking husband is much stronger and heavier).
41. E.g., Allen v. United States, 157 U.S. 675, 680 (1895) (dictum) (black attacked
by many whites with sticks); State v. Pearson, 288 N.C. 34, 215 S.E.2d 598 (1975) (dic-
tum) (use of deadly weapon may be justified when defendant is attacked by more than
one assailant).
42. E.g., Hinson v. State, 218 So. 2d 36 (Miss. 1969); Easterling v. State, 267 P.2d
185 (Okla. Crim. 1954) (court stated that it was conceivable that a man might be so bru-
tal in striking a woman with his fists as to cause her death): Kress v. State, 176 Tenn.
478, 144 S.W.2d 735 (1940).
43. Even when the defendant was a woman who killed her assailant, and even
though the court found that it was "conceivable that a man might be so brutal in striking
a woman with his fists as to cause her death," the jury instructions limited the factors jus-
tifying the use of a deadly weapon to differences in size, age, or physical condition.
Easterling v. State, 267 P.2d 185, 188 (Okla. Crim. 1954).
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The narrow effect of the Wanrow decision for a woman defendant,
however, is to require that an evaluation of a self-defense plea include
an examination not only of physical size and strength, but also of the
psychological traits acquired growing up in American society" which
would make reasonable a woman's belief that a deadly weapon must
be used to protect herself from an actual or threatened attack even if
the assailant will attack only with fists. 45
Traditionally, women have been denied access to the development
of those skills necessary to repel a male assailant without using deadly
weapons. 46 In addition to this learning disadvantage, women faced
with the need to defend themselves are at a psychological disadvan-
tage which is often more critical to the final outcome than either size
or strength. 47 Men generally have been trained and encouraged since
childhood to use their bodies aggressively. 48 In a combative encounter
they know that they are able to fight. Women, on the other hand, are
socialized to be passive, especially with regard to physical endeavors;
they are seldom encouraged to develop defensive fighting skills. 49
Consequently, women experience great anxiety when confronted with
a situation in which there is a need to resort to aggression,5 0 an expe-
rience one author has called a "paralysis of will." 5 '
Recently several cases have arisen in which women, primarily in re-
sponse to sexual assaults, have resorted to weapons to defend them-
selves against unarmed assailants, sometimes a considerable time after
44. See notes 46-53 and accompanying text infra.
45. See note 21 supra.
46. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON, & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE LAW-CAUSES AND REMEDIES 1020-37 (1975) (discussing sex-segregated athletic
programs) [hereinafter cites as B. BABCOCK]; S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL-
MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 401 (1975).
47. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 46, at 401.
48. E.g., S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 46, at 401; J. Bardwick & E. Douvan, Am-
bivalence: The Socialization of Women, in READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN
52-58 (J. Bardwick ed. 1972).
49. N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, SEXUAL ASSAULT: CONFRONTING RAPE IN AMERICA 275
(1976); J. Bardwick & E. Douvan, supra note 48.
50. READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 131 (J. Bardwick ed. 1972) (discuss-
ing the findings in F. Cosentina & A.B. Heilbrun, Jr., Anxiety Correlates of Sex-Role
Identity in College Students, 14 PSYCH. REPRINTS 729 (1964)).
51. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 46, at 402. Accord, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974, § 4,
at 19, col. 3.
Although women have been encouraged to depend on others for protection, this pro-
tection often has not been provided, especially in cases of assault on women or children.
See generally Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 919, 927 n.2 (1973); Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 14-15, State v. Wan-
row, 88 Wn. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (summarizing statistics and surveys support-
ing this conclusion).
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the assault has been completed. 52 While the resulting decisions vary,
the defense has consistently emphasized that a woman's psychological
background might make reasonable her fear of death or great bodily
harm when faced with an unarmed assailant even though such fear
would not be reasonable in a man similarly situated. 53
The Washington court, in recognizing the importance of underly-
ing, nonphysical perceptions on a woman's subjective impression, has
made a realistic and important addition to the law of self-defense.
2. Use of the masculine gender
The court found the use of masculine pronouns to be a separate le-
gal error in that the use of the masculine gender left the impression
that the standard to be applied was an objective standard applicable
to an altercation between two men rather than the female defendant
and her male assailant.54 This compounded the errors in the instruc-
tion limiting the use of a deadly weapon.55 The Washington court
cited no authority in support of its conclusion and the holding is ap-
parently without precedent. 56 The use of masculine pronouns in a
52. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 54 Cal. App. 3d 61, 126 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1975), cert.
denied 426 U.S. 911 (1976), on retrial, People v. Garcia, No. 4259 (Super. Ct. Cal.
March 4, 1977) (Garcia was acquitted); State v. Little, No. 74-4176 (Super. Ct. N.C.
Aug. 15, 1975) (black woman prisoner's acquittal based on self-defense for the killing of
a white jailer who raped her). See generally N. GAGER & C. SCHURR, supra note 49, at
196-200 (discussing other cases with similar fact patterns). Gager also discusses a Texas
organization called W.A.S.P. (Women Armed for Self-Protection) and suggests this is a
possible course for the future if rape prevention, law enforcement, and prosecution re-
main ineffective for the protection of women. The Wanrow, Garcia, Little, and several
other cases in which women defendants raised self-defense pleas are discussed in
Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 149 (1978).
53. The literature and case discussions, see notes 40-43 supra, seem to assume that
a "reasonable woman" would be fearful of an unarmed assailant in circumstances
where a "reasonable man" would not. While this assumption may be true in a majority
of cases entitling women to defensive measures not allowed to men, in some factual
settings it may work an injustice on an individual male defendant. A truly egalitarian
legal doctrine would allow for individual characteristics and perceptions in all cases.
54. 88 Wn. 2d at 240, 559 P.2d at 558. The court reached this result even though the
trial court in Instruction I had said, " 'the use of the masculine gender shall be under-
stood to apply equally to a woman.' " Supplemental Brief of Respondent, supra note 5 1.
at 19.
The rule for interpreting jury instructions in Washington is generally that error is not
"a matter of semantics, but rather whether the jury was misled as to its function." State
v. Upton, 16 Wn. App. 195, 204, 556 P.2d 239, 245 (1976). Accord, State v. Mello, 79
Wn. 2d 279, 484 P.2d 910 (1971); State v. Durning, 71 Wn. 2d 675. 678-79, 430 P.2d
546. 548 (1967); State v. Redden, 71 Wn. 2d 147, 152, 426 P.2d 854, 857 (1967).
55. 88 Wn. 2d at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
56. One other court has considered the possible error in using masculine gender
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generic sense57 is pervasive in the legal setting, in which decisions are
often reached after employing a "reasonable man" standard.5 8
At least one legal scholar has examined the linguistic evidence on
the use of the masculine gender, particularly of the phrase "reason-
able man," and has concluded that it is one "latent with gender bias,"
rather than a "neutral, generic term. '59 Elementary linguistic theory
asserts that the role of language is not simply to preserve thought, but
additionally to structure thought through the defining of social experi-
ence and "social reality. '60 It has been observed in linguistic literature
that "the matter of gender and sex referents is intricately mixed with
other behavioral categories and linguistic dimensions."16 In other
words, language is used to communicate and categorize human expe-
rience and perceptions, 62 and the use of masculine and feminine gen-
der pronouns serves to set off some roles as "male" and others as "fe-
male." 63
Recently, studies have been conducted to examine the validity of
the assumption that masculine gender is understood to include
pronouns in jury instructions for female defendants. Finding no error, the court stated
that the argument "required no serious discussion." State v. Little, 27 N.C. App. 467,
219 S.E.2d 494, 499 (1975). This opinion is the burglary conviction for which Joann Lit-
tle was sentenced to jail where she was raped. See note 52 supra.
57. "Generic" is defined to mean "relating or applied to or descriptive of all mem-
bers of a genus, class or group." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 945
(P. Gove ed. 1961). More specifically the generic use of masculine pronouns is intended
to refer to masculine and feminine persons.
58. The pervasiveness of this use is discussed in Collins, Language History and the
Legal Process: A Profile of the "Reasonable Man," 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 311 (1977). How-
ever, based on the Wanrow decision, the recent editing of Washington Pattern Jury
Instructions for Criminal Cases reveals an effort to avoid using masculine gender pro-
nouns or adjectives when the person involved may be either a man or a woman. Preface
to I 1 WASHINGTON PRACTICE at VIII (1977). The technique of using masculine gender
pronouns to include the feminine gender persists in the Washington statutes. E.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.04.110(17), (27) (1976).
59. Collins, supra note 58, at 312. The author traces the origin of the reasonable
man construct and suggests that the phrase is now deceptive and outmoded in American
law. At least one state has rewritten its constitution to eliminate masculine gender pro-
nouns used in the generic sense and has replaced them with neutral language. Compare
CAL. CONST. art. I (West 1954) with CAL. CONST. art. I (West Supp. 1978) (article I was
amended in 1974).
60. Collins, supra note 58, at 321 (discussing Sapir, The Status of Linguistics as a
Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF EDWARD SAPIR IN LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PER-
SONALITY (D. Mandelbaum ed. 1951)). See generally A. SCHAFF, LANGUAGE AND COGNI-
TION (0. Wojtasiewicz trans. 1973); B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY (J.
Carroll ed. 1956).
61. M. KEY, MALE/FEMALE LANGUAGE 87 (1975).
62. C. MILLER & K. SWIFT, WORDS AND WOMEN 55-70 (1976).
63. Id.
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women. 64 In one such study, conducted in 1972, college students
were instructed to select pictures to be used in connection with chap-
ter headings. 65 The group given chapter titles such as "Social Man,"
"Industrial Man," or "Political Man" chose, "to a statistically signifi-
cant degree," only pictures of men to represent the titles, while stu-
dents given the gender-neutral titles "Society," "Industrial Life,"
"Political Behavior," chose pictures of both men and women. 66 Data
such as these lend support to the Washington court's finding that the
use of the pronoun "he" rather than "she" in jury instructions at the
trial of a woman defendant would create the image of a man fighting,
and thus lead the jury to apply an objective standard-rather than the
proper subjective standard-to a woman defendant's plea of self-de-
fense.
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The lack of articulation or express analysis by the court in Wanrow
makes future application of the decision uncertain. However, a possi-
ble analytical approach is to identify the assumption underlying a par-
ticular legal doctrine or practice, and then to use empirical social
science data to test the validity and operation of that assumption. Of-
ten such an examination will expose erroneous or prejudicial factors
which the traditional case analysis approach will leave undiscovered.
An examination of a sample sex-related case will show how this em-
pirical approach has provided an alternative when precedent is shown
to be based on latent discriminatory biases. 67
64. C. MILLER & K. SWIFT, supra note 62, at 37. These authors conclude that "the
mass of semantic evidence" is against the view that "man" is understood to mean "per-
son." Accord, M. KEY, supra note 61, at 88.
65. C. MILLER & K. SWIFT, supra note 62, at 21. The authors also discuss a similar
study in which the results supported the conclusion that the generic use of the word
"man" tends to cause people to think of a male rather than of a female. Id. at 24-25.
66. Id. at 21.
67. Although equal protection challenges based on racial discrimination differ from
those based on sex discrimination in significant ways-race is a "suspect" classification
requiring strict scrutiny while gender is not, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)-a
meaningful comparison may be made regarding the use of social science data. Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was a turning point in the area of racial segre-
gation and equal protection. In that decision the Court examined the legal doctrine of
"separate but equal," established in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1895), in light of
empirical social science data. The latent assumption that separate was equal was under-
mined by the empirical observations. For example, one study cited by the Court tested
black children's attitudes toward their own race using black and white dolls. Black chil-
dren, from both segregated and integrated schools, more frequently preferred the white
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In rape cases the court will commonly give the jury three unique in-
structions.68 One will instruct as to the degree of force which the pro-
"secution must show to negate the defense that the victim consented. A
second will emphasize the need for corroboration of the prosecuting
witness's testimony. A third will instruct the jury to regard with care
and caution the prosecuting witness's testimony. 69
Recently, in People v. Rincon-Pineda,70 the California Supreme
Court examined the origin and justifications of the third instruction
and found that it had "outworn its usefulness." 7' The court reviewed a
case in which the trial judge refused to give the then mandatory
cautionary instruction relating to the testimony of the victim.72 The
court found that the refusal was nonprejudicial error in the case be-
fore it.7' The court held the cautionary instruction was no longer to
be given mandatory application 74 and in addition found the instruc-
tion as worded inappropriate in any context and disapproved its fur-
ther discretionary use.75 This result was reached after the court first
examined the history of the instruction and then examined the instruc-
tion "with the benefit of contemporary empirical and theoretical
analyses of the prosecution of sex offenses in general and rape in par-
ticular."76
doll, choosing the white doll as the "nice" one and the black doll as the "bad" one. P.
ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 183-92 (1972) (evaluating all social
science studies cited by the Court in Brown). Thus the Court utilized social science data
to expose the underlying discrimination present in the well-established legal doctrine of
"separate but equal." See Ball, Lawyers and Social Scientists: Guiding the Guides, 5
VILL. L. REv. 215, 220-23 (1959-60). But see Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criti-
cisin of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REv. 244 (1959-60) (discussing criticisms
of the Court's use of social science data in Brown). See generally P. ROSEN, supra at
134-72.
68. B. BABCOCK, supra note 46, at 853.
69. Id.
70. 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
71. Id. at 877, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Accord, State v. Feddersen,
230 N.W.2d 510, 515 (Iowa 1975).
72. The cautionary instruction, mandatory in California prior to this decision and
given at Rincon-Pineda's first trial, read:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one which is eas-
ily made and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is
innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female person
named in the information with caution.
Id. at 871, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
73. Id. at 873, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
74. Id. at 876, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
75. Id. at 882, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
76. Id. at 877, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128. The "contemporary empirical
and theoretical analyses" the court examined are summarized at id. at 879-82, 538 P.2d
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The instruction originated during the seventeenth century in the
writings of Sir Matthew Hale, 77 and was justified at that time as a pro-
tection for a defendant against the testimony of children, fabricated
allegations of rape, and the passions aroused by the charge.7 8 The
court in Rincon-Pineda found that the protection Hale sought to pro-
vide with the cautionary instruction is obtained presently-although
not in Hale's time-through constitutional safeguards within criminal
justice procedures. These included the presumption of innocence, the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to confront
witnesses, and the right of the accused to effective counsel.79
Additionally, the court looked to empirical data to determine
whether the charge of rape was in fact "easily made, and difficult to
defend against." 80 The reporting rates, the conviction statistics, and
the psychological and sociological studies on female witnesses all
showed the contrary to be true.81 The court also found evidence in
empirical studies that juries are not aroused by the passions feared by
Hale; rather, juries tend to look for mitigating factors or precipitating
behavior on the part of the victims. 82
Thus, the justifications for the instruction are no longer valid, and,
while the goal of protecting the defendant exists in the present legal
system, there are alternative methods to insure due consideration of
the relative weight of the evidence. The Rincon-Pineda court sug-
gested that instructions as to "the existence or non-existence of a bias,
at 257-60, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129-3 1, and include FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1973
(1974), CAL. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 1972 (1973),
and data presented in several law review articles. See notes 78 & 81 infra.
77. 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1680). cited in Note. The Rape Corrobo-
ration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365. 1382 (1972).
78. Hale based his argument that corroboration and caution were necessary in rely-
ing on the testimony of women who claimed to be the victims of sexual offenses on his
experience of personally witnessing rape prosecutions which resulted from malicious
fabrications by women. 14 Cal. 3d at 873, 538 P.2d at 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Since
that time, little other support has been found for the assumption that rape charges are es-
pecially likely to be fabricated. One author suggests that the "evidence" primarily relied
on consists of five case studies and psychological reports made prior to 1933. B. BAB-
COCK, sapra note 46, at 855. The corroboration requirement, which finds its origin in
such outdated studies, must necessarily fail "to take into account the changing role of
women in American society." Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal
Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1378 (1972).
79. 14 Cal. 3d at 878, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
80. Id. at 871, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
81. A summary of these data is found in Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in
Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1973). See also Note. The Rape Corroboration
Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972).
82. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 254 (1966).
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interest or motive" should be given.8 3 These instructions, however,
would be given in all criminal trials in which credibility or corrobora-
tion was at issue, not only in those cases in which a male assailant was
accused by a female victim of rape.8 4 In this way the rape victim
would enjoy the same status as any other prosecuting witness in a
criminal case,8 5 and an element of latent sexism would be eliminated
from modern criminal procedure.
A similar approach was suggested by Judge Bazelon of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Wiley,8 6 a case dealing with the corroboration requirement
as applied to a twelve-year-old prosecuting witness in a carnal knowl-
edge case.87 He examined the justifications for the corroboration re-
quirement in sex-related cases in light of present empirical data and
concluded that the "rationales reveal a tangled web of legitimate con-
cerns, out-dated beliefs and deep-seated prejudices."88
IV. CONCLUSION
The goal of traditional self-defense rules is to apply a subjective test
with which to judge the defendant's actions. With reference to female
defendants, the assumption, unquestioped until Wanrow, was that this
subjective standard could be applied even though the female defen-
dant's justifiable use of a deadly weapon was limited to cases in which
83. 14 Cal. 3d at 885, 538 P.2d at 261, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
84. Id.
85. 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 691, 696 (1976).
86. 492 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
87. See generally Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Re-
form, 81 YALE LJ. 1365 (1972) (an evaluation of the traditional justifications for the
corroboration requirement in light of recent sociological and law enforcement studies).
88. 492 F.2d at 552. It has also been suggested that a change in the evidence laws
regarding consent should be made, as the current evidentiary rules admitting evidence
of reputation and prior acts of unchastity are "based on outmoded conceptions of hu-
man behavior." B. BABCOCK, supra note 46, at 839-40. That author urges the use of so-
ciological and psychological studies concerning current sexual mores to show the non-
existence of a "reputation for unchastity." Id. In other words, the approach suggested is
to examine the traditional legal assumption in rape trials of the relevance of the prose-
cuting witness's prior sexual history in light of the sociological evidence that, in modern
society, there is no relation between chastity and a witness's credibility. See generally
State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 73-74, 533 P.2d 389, 391 (1975) (prior sexual miscon-
duct has little relationship to tendency of witness to tell the truth). The Geer case is dis-
cussed in a recent note reviewing the new Washington statute limiting the admissibility
of witnesses' prior sexual history in rape cases in Washington. Recent Development,
Admissibility of the Victim's Past Sexual Behavior Under Washington's Rape Evidence
Law, 52 WASH. L. REV. 1011 (1977).
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a "reasonable man" would perceive that the assailant threatened
death or grievous bodily harm. This "subjective" standard, it was as-
sumed, was achieved even though the jury considered only tangible
factors such as relative size and strength, and even though the courts
used masculine gender pronouns in the jury instructions.
However, these assumptions are shown to be incorrect. 89 The sub-
jective standard, applied to female defendants, is reached only after
considering intangibles relating to the defendant's psychological posi-
tion as a woman facing a male assailant. Additionally, empirical lin-
guistic studies show that masculine gender pronouns are not univer-
sally understood in the generic sense. They may in fact, when used in
jury instructions on self-defense, induce the jury to apply an objective
standard through an imagined altercation between two men. These
erroneous assumptions work against the doctrinal goal of applying a
subjective90 standard in self-defense adjudications, just as the errone-
ous assumptions behind the cautionary instructions given in Rincon-
Pineda, exposed through an examination of current empirical data,
worked against the goal of equal justice for rape victims. 91
89. The effect of social science data on the outcome of a trial can be seen as varying
along a continuum. See Loh, Some Uses and Linits of Statistics and Social Science in
the Jtiice Process, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND DISCRETIONARY LAW 10 (L. Abt & I.
Stewart ed. 1978). At one end of the continuum are the cases in which an issue has such
moral and philosophical undertones (for example, capital punishment) that a court may
decide the question based on ethical or legal principles (for example, "cruel and unusual
punishment") and then use social science data (for example, the minimal effect of capi-
tal punishment as deterrence) to buttress or support the result. Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), may be viewed as fitting this category. At the other end of
the continuum are cases in which moral or philosophical involvement is minimal (for
example, patent infringement cases) and social science data (for example, surveys on
the confusion of one trademark with another by the public) may be the determinative
basis for a decision. See generally P. ROSEN, supra note 67, at 102-05, 202-03 (compar-
ing patent infringement cases with cases in which a court abandons precedent and
overtly makes constitutional law); Maslow, How Social Scientists Can Shape Legal
Processes, 5 VILL. L. REV. 241, 242 (1959-60). In other words, when strong moral and
philosophical implications exist, social science data will not be determinative of the re-
sult, but may be used only to support a decision already reached on other grounds. The
situation is reversed when no moral or philosophical undertones exist.
The Wanrow case falls somewhere in the middle, along with other cases which involve
an issue with some moral and philosophical implications but not such strong implica-
tions as to be determinative of the result regardless of the empirical data. In these cases,
social science data may be used either as the basis for a result, or as support for a deci-
sion reached on other grounds. In Wanrow, the data appears to have been supportive
rather than determinative of the decision.
90. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
91. Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court exa-
mined social science data and found support for its view that the erroneous legal as-
sumption of "separate but equal" worked against the doctrinal goal of equal educa-
tional opportunities and treatment for all children. See note 67 supra.
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The Washington court, in the Wanrow decision, reviewed women's
self-defense law in the light of current empirical social science and lin-
guistic data and found that a subjective standard was not being
achieved under the current practice. The court properly exposed these
erroneous assumptions and discarded them.
Jennifer Marsh
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